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In this paper, we generalize a secured direct communication process between N users with partial and 
full cooperation of quantum server. So, N − 1 disjointed users u1, u2, …, uN−1 can transmit a secret 
message of classical bits to a remote user uN by utilizing the property of dense coding and Pauli 
unitary transformations. The authentication process between the quantum server and the users are 
validated by EPR entangled pair and CNOT gate. Afterwards, the remained EPR will generate shared 
GHZ states which are used for directly transmitting the secret message. The partial cooperation 
process indicates that N − 1 users can transmit a secret message directly to a remote user uN through 
a quantum channel. Furthermore, N − 1 users and a remote user uN can communicate without an 
established quantum channel among them by a full cooperation process. The security analysis of 
authentication and communication processes against many types of attacks proved that the attacker 
cannot gain any information during intercepting either authentication or communication processes. 
Hence, the security of transmitted message among N users is ensured as the attacker introduces an 
error probability irrespective of the sequence of measurement.
The pioneering work of Bennett and Brassard1 has been developed for the purpose of understanding 
quantum cryptography which is one of the most significant aspects of the laws of the quantum mechan-
ics. This cryptography guarantees unconditional security2–5 that is proven through the no-cloning the-
orem6 as the transmitted quantum bit cannot be replicated or copied but its state can be teleported. 
Quantum teleportation and dense coding are the most often used quantum principles. In the former, 
the quantum information can be transmitted based on both classical communication and the maximally 
shared quantum entanglement among the distant parties7–10. In the latter, the classical information can 
be encoded and transmitted based on one quantum bit and on the maximally shared quantum entan-
glement among the distant parties as each quantum bit can transmit two classical bits11,12. A number of 
approaches and prototypes can be used to exploit quantum principles in order to secure communication 
between two parties and multiple parties13–17. While these approaches use different techniques to ensure 
private communication among authorized users, most of them still depend on the generation of secret 
random keys18,19.
A quantum secret communication concept has recently been introduced; it is a kind of quantum 
communication in which secret messages can be transmitted through a quantum channel with or with-
out additional classical communications20–58. A quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) trans-
mits the secret messages directly between the communicating parties, from sender to receiver, without 
additional classical communication protocols, except for those used for the necessary eavesdropping 
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check. In other words, the quantum key distribution (QKD) process and the classical communication 
of ciphertext are reduced into one single quantum communication procedure in QSDC. In QSDC, the 
concept of direct transmission of secret messages involves two kinds of meaning: On one hand, secret 
messages rather than raw keys are transmitted; on the other hand, the receiver does not require any 
separate classical communication from the sender to decode out secret messages26,31,32,39–52,57,59. In 2002, 
Long and Liu52 put forward the first QSDC protocol, in which the secret message is transmitted directly. 
In the same year, by taking advantage of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs as quantum informa-
tion carriers, Boström and Felbinger20 put forward the famous QSDC protocol referred to as the ping 
- pong protocol later. In60, the authors enhanced the capability of the ping - pong protocol by adding 
two more unitary operations. In22, a two-step quantum secure direct communication protocol was pro-
posed for transferring quantum information by utilizing Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pair blocks 
to secure the transmission. In21, the authentication and communication process was performed using 
Greenberg–Horne–Zeilinger (GHZ) states. First, the GHZ states were used for authentication purposes; 
the remaining GHZ states were used to transmit the secret message directly. In17, the architecture for a 
centralized multicast scheme was proposed basing on a hybrid model of quantum key distribution and 
classical symmetric encryption. The proposed scheme solved the key generation and the management 
problem using a single entity called centralized Quantum Multicast Key Distribution Centre. In61, a novel 
multiparty concurrent quantum secure direct communication protocol based on GHZ states and dense 
coding is introduced. In59, a managed quantum secure direct communication protocol based on quan-
tum encoding and incompletely entangled states is presented. In57, a scheme for quantum secure direct 
dialogue protocols, which is adapted to both collective-dephasing noise and collective-rotation noise, is 
proposed by using the logical Bell states as the traveling states to resist collective noise. Different from 
QSDC, there is another kind of quantum secret communication named deterministic secure quantum 
communication (DSQC), where the receiver needs a separate classical communication from the sender 
to help decode out secret messages. In the framework of DSQC, the receiver can read out the secret mes-
sage only after the transmission of at least one bit of additional classical information for each quantum 
bit, different from QSDC in which the secret message can be read out directly without exchanging any 
classical information20,23,24,26,29,36,38,53,55,56,58. In53, a novel scheme for deterministic secure quantum com-
munication (DSQC) over collective rotating noisy channel is proposed as a four special two-qubit states 
are found can constitute a noise-free subspaces, and so are utilized as quantum information carriers. In 
2002, Beige et al.54 first proposed a DSQC scheme based on single-photon two-quantum bit states. Then 
in 2004, Yan and Zhang24 proposed a DSQC scheme based on EPR pairs and quantum teleportation. In 
2005, Gao et al.55 and Man et al.26 proposed two DSQC protocols also based on entanglement swapping. 
In 2006, with EPR pairs based on the secret transmitting order of particles, Zhu et al.20 proposed two 
DSQC schemes, one is a round trip scheme, and the other is a one way trip scheme. Lee et al.29 proposed 
a protocol for controlled DSQC with Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states. In 2009, Xiu et al.56 
proposed a controlled DSQC scheme using five qubit entangled states and two-step security test. In58, a 
hyper entangled Bell state is used to design faithful deterministic secure quantum communication and 
authentication protocol over collective-rotation and collective-dephasing noisy channel, which doubles 
the channel capacity compared with using an ordinary Bell state as a carrier; a logical hyper entangled 
Bell state immune to collective-rotation and collective-dephasing noise is constructed. Different quantum 
authentication approaches have been developed for preventing various types of attacks and especially 
man-in-the-middle attack62–66.
However, these quantum secure direct communication approaches are still prone to provide a low 
degree of effectiveness and an inadequate level of security. Here, we propose a convenient and efficient 
scheme for transmitting a series of classical messages among two, three, or more users (generalized to N 
users). Therefore, −N 1 disjointed users , , …, −u u uN1 2 1 can transmit a secret message consisting of 
classical bits to a remote user uN. The transmission process is accomplished by utilizing the property of 
dense coding and Pauli unitary transformations. First, the quantum server authenticates and verifies the 
identities of the communicated disjointed users through the generated entangled shared key and the 
Controlled – NOT gate. After the authentication is completed successfully, the remaining generated 
entangled shared key is used to generate shared GHZ states, which are intended for directly transmitting 
the secret message. If there is a quantum channel among the users, they can communicate using our 
partial cooperation process. In that case, −N 1 disjointed users generate a random sequence of bit 
strings of the transmitted plain message. Next, each user applies an appropriate unitary transformation 
according to his plain message bit string value and transmits the transformed message to uN. Then, uN 
retrieves the original sent secret message by applying the N – GHZ measurement to his/her particle and 
, , …, −u u uN1 2 1 particles. Afterwards, the quantum server calculates the status of his or her particle 
according to x basis and announces his or her measurement results. Then, uN uses those measurements 
and the quantum server publication to retrieve the original sent secret bits by , , …, −u u uN1 2 1. If there 
is no quantum channel among the users, they can use our full cooperation process, but in this case the 
transformed message will be sent to the quantum server instead of uN.
The efficiency and effectiveness of our protocol can be summarized into five points. First, the GHZ 
state is the maximally entangled state, so that the correlation can be more easily destroyed once any 
single N particle is attacking. Second, using the N – GHZ particle makes eavesdropping detection more 
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effective and secure in comparison to some of the other QSDC protocols. For example22, proposed a 
two-step quantum secure direct communication where an EPR pair block is used to transfer the secret 
message. Furthermore34, proposed a multi-step quantum secure direct communication protocol where 
blocks of a multi-particle maximally entangled states are used to transmit secret messages. These proto-
cols fail because the eavesdropper can capture some of the particles in the sequence and transmit what 
is left to the receiver through the quantum channel. If the eavesdropper intercepts the message sequence 
and conducts a GHZ measurement, he/she can retrieve some of the secret message. Therefore, the prob-
ability of information leakage exists. Third, our protocol increases the transmitted information capacity 
by using N - GHZ states as these provide a large Hilbert space. Fourth, −N 1 users can transmit a 
particular message to the receiver, uN, so the protocol is more effective as no quantum bits have to be 
discarded. Furthermore, the protocol is instantaneous as the receiver, ,uN  is able to decode the message 
while receiving it and there is no additional classical exchange between −N 1 (sender) users and uN 
(receiver). Finally, the security analysis of the authentication and communication processes of our pro-
tocol against many types of attacks proves that our protocol is unconditionally secured and the attacker 
will not reveal any information about the key or the transmitted message in the case of directly calculat-
ing the transferred particles over the communicated channel from the quantum server to the disjoint 
user, and vice versa, as the attacker introduces an error probability irrespective of the sequence of 
measurement.
Methods
Bell States and Controlled – NOT. The Bell states are one of the main theories of quantum infor-
mation processing that denote entanglement67,68. Bell states are specific, highly entangled quantum states 
of two particles denoted by EPR. There are many research groups that proposed different approaches for 
realizing and experimentally generating EPR states. In69 a high-intensity source of polarization-entan-
gled photon pairs can be realized with high momentum definition. The proposed scheme allowed ready 
preparation of all four of EPR-Bell states with two-photon fringe visibilities in excess of 97%. In70 EPR 
can be experimentally setup by utilizing light pulse from a mode-locked Ti-sapphire laser through a fre-
quency doubler. The ultraviolet pulse from the doubler is split into two beams by a balanced beam-split-
ter and is focused on four pairs of BBO crystals to provide four EPR photon pairs. In our scheme, EPR 
pair can be realized by utilizing the same concept introduced in70.
These entangled particles have interrelated physical characteristics despite being spatially separated. 
When the quantum state is a multi-qubit, transformation can be achieved by applying the controlled 
quantum gates CNOT (Controlled – NOT), FREDKIN (Controlled – SWAP), and TOFFOLI (Controlled 
– Controlled – NOT). CNOT has an input of two qubits. It transforms the computational basis states by 
flipping the state of the second qubit only when the first qubit has a measurement of 1; otherwise, the 
quantum state remains unchanged2,3,5,7,11. The four Bell states (EPR pairs) used in both the authentication 
and communication processes in our scheme are defined by (Eq. (1). Authentication between the quantum 
server and users is achieved by the generated entangled shared key |Φ 〉+qu  and the −Controlled NOT  gate. 
At the time of registration, the quantum server and disjoint user share a binary authentication key, AK. 
Each sends one entangled particle to form an EPR pair, |Φ 〉+qu , in which the q and u particles correspond 
with the quantum server and disjoint user, respectively. The quantum server preserves q at its location 
and transmits the u particle to the intended disjoint user, as shown in (Eq. (2). Once the disjoint user 
obtains its u particle, it prepares a new state particle, n (See (Eq. 3), by encoding the shared authentica-
tion information according to the specified operation. When the quantum CNOT gate ₡OP is performed 
on the transmitted particle and n, the resulted particle r is a state of three entanglement particles (See 
Eq. 4). After applying the requested operation, the disjoint user keeps particle u at its side and sends the 
resulted particle Φr  to the quantum server. Once the quantum server receives the resulted particle, Φr , 
it decodes it by applying a quantum CNOT gate ₡OP on both the local particle q and n (See Eq. 6, 7). The 
quantum server verifies the identity of the disjoint user by measuring φn  on the basis of Z. The resulted 
state must measure at either 0 or 1. If the measurement is equal to ,−A A2i 1 2i , the disjoint user is 
authenticated. However, if the resulted measurement is erroneous—meaning it is greater than the agreed 
threshold—then the authentication process will be terminated. Afterwards, the key is increased to 
authenticate the next disjoint user, sending the quantum server recursively back to step one until all 
disjoint users are authenticated.
ψΦ = ( ± ), = ( ± )
( )
± ±1
2
00 11 1
2
01 10
1
|Φ 〉 = (| 〉 + | 〉
( )
+ 1
2
0 0 1 1
2qu q u q u
φ = ⊗ ( )−A A 3n 2i 1 2i
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
4Scientific RepoRts | 5:16080 | DOI: 10.1038/srep16080
where ≤ ≤i N1  and ⊗ denotes the specified user operation.
φ|Φ 〉 = (| 〉 ⊗ |Φ 〉) ( )
+₡ 4OP n qur
where ₡OP = ₡ 0 at =−A 02i 1  and ₡OP = ₡ 1 at =−A 12i 1 . ₡0 and ₡1 are described by (Eq. (5))
= ⊗ + ⊗ ,
= + + ⊗ + − − ⊗ ( )
I X
I X
₡ 0 0 1 1
₡ 5
0
1
where | + = (| + | ), | − = (| − | )0 1 0 11
2
1
2
|Φ′ = (|Φ ) ( )₡ 6OPr r
( )φ|Φ′ = | ⊗ |Φ ( )+₡ 7OP n qur
Quantum Bit Transformation. Quantum computers can manipulate quantum information to trans-
form a pure or mixed quantum state into another corresponding pure or mixed state2,3,5,7,11. In our 
scheme, the unitary transformation operations are defined by (Eq. (8)). For simplicity, we use X, Y, Z 
instead of σ σ σ, ,ix y z, respectively. These are used to transform the GHZ state at the side of the sender(s) 
into an unreadable form that corresponds to the generated original classical message before transmitting 
it to the receiver.
= +
= +
= −
= − ( )
I 0 0 1 1
X 0 1 1 0
Y 0 1 1 0
Z 0 0 1 1 8
Tables 1–4 describe the correlation between the received classical value and its corresponding unitary 
and GHZ transformations. Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the correlation that occurs during the communication 
process between two disjoint users (ui, u j) with partial and full cooperation of the quantum server, 
respectively. The ui generates a sequence of random bit strings of transmitted, plain message. According 
to each two transmitted bits, (00, 01, 10, 11), the disjoint user, ui, applies one of the unitary transforma-
tion operations, Ŭ = {Ŭ1, Ŭ2, Ŭ3, Ŭ4}, which correspond to the four Pauli operations, {I, X, Y, Z}, respec-
tively. Afterwards, the GHZ states convert according to the transmitted bits and the ui transformation 
Value First Bit Second Bit ui Transformation GHZ Transformation
0 0 0 Iui (|Φ 〉 |+〉 + |Φ 〉 |−〉 )
+ −
ij q ij q
1
2
1 0 1 Xui ψ ψ(| 〉 |+〉 − | 〉 |−〉 )
+ −
ij q ij q
1
2
2 1 0 Yui ψ ψ(| 〉 |+〉 − | 〉 |−〉 )
− +
ij q ij q
1
2
3 1 1 Zui (|Φ 〉 |+〉 + |Φ 〉 |−〉 )
− +
ij q ij q
1
2
Table 1.  Correlation between Received Classical Value and its Corresponding Unitary, GHZ 
Transformations and Quantum Bit Transformation Correlation during the Communication Process 
between Two Disjoint Users with Partial Cooperation of Quantum Server.
Value First Bit Second Bit ui Transformation GHZ Transformation
0 0 0 Iui (|Φ 〉 |+〉 + |Φ 〉 |−〉 )
+ −
iq j iq j
1
2
1 0 1 Xui ψ ψ(| 〉 |+〉 − | 〉 |−〉 )
+ −
iq j iq j
1
2
2 1 0 Yui ψ ψ(| 〉 |+〉 − | 〉 |−〉 )
− +
iq j iq j
1
2
3 1 1 Zui (|Φ 〉 |+〉 + |Φ 〉 |−〉 )
− +
iq j iq j
1
2
Table 2.  Correlation between Received Classical Value and its Corresponding Unitary, GHZ 
Transformations and Quantum Bit Transformation Correlation during the Communication Process 
between Two Disjoint Users with Full Cooperation of Quantum Server.
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(See Supplementary Information 1) for the communication process between two disjointed users with 
partial and full cooperation of the quantum server).
Tables  3 and 4 describe the same correlation but among three disjointed users (ui, uj and ul) with 
partial and full cooperation of quantum server respectively. The difference that a new user uj generates 
a random sequences bits string of transmitted plain message. uj applies ΨIu j  or ΨXu j  according to the 
value of particle 0 or 1 respectively. Afterwards, the GHZ states will be converted according to transmit-
ted bits, ui and uj transformations (see Supplementary Information 2 for Communication Process 
between Three Disjoint Users with Partial and Full Cooperation of Quantum Server).
GHZ States, Measurement and Source. A GHZ state is a certain type of maximally entangled 
quantum state that includes at least three qubits (particles). This kind of state was first examined by 
Greenberger, Horne, and Zeilinger in 198971. The standard GHZ state is defined as qubits = 3; when 
qubits > 3, the GHZ state is defined by Eq. (9) seen below:
=
+
( )
⊗ ⊗
GHZ
0 1
2 9
qubits qubits
In our scheme, when the quantum server receives a user(s) request for communication with another 
user, the quantum server distributes GHZ entanglement states among the involved participants’ users in 
the communication process. Distribution is established after successful completion of the authentication 
process prior to the commencement of the communication process. The quantum server distributes all 
generated particles but holds one for itself. As a consequence, the quantum server and the participated 
users become entangled due to the presence of only one particle per distributed GHZ state. In addition, 
GHZ measurement is used by the receiver or quantum server, depending on the type of cooperation used 
during inter-user communication. Consistent with the GHZ measurement result, the receiver determines 
Value ui Bits uj Bit ui and uj Transformations GHZ Transformation
0 0 0 0 ( ⊗ )I Iui uj (|Ψ 〉 |+〉 + |Ψ 〉 |−〉 )
+ −
ijl q ijl q
1
2
1 0 0 1 ( ⊗ )I Xui uj (|φ 〉 |+〉 + |φ 〉 |−〉 )
+ −
ijl q ijl q
1
2
2 0 1 0 ( ⊗ )X Iui uj (|ψ 〉 |+〉 − |ψ 〉 |−〉 )
+ −
ijl q ijl q
1
2
3 0 1 1 ( ⊗ )X Xui uj (|ϕ 〉 |+〉 − |ϕ 〉 |−〉 )
+ −
ijl q ijl q
1
2
4 1 0 0 ( ⊗ )Y Iui uj (|ψ 〉 |+〉 − |ψ 〉 |−〉 )
− +
ijl q ijl q
1
2
5 1 0 1 ( ⊗ )Y Xui uj (|ϕ 〉 |+〉 − |ϕ 〉 |−〉 )
− +
ijl q ijl q
1
2
6 1 1 0 ( ⊗ )Z Iui uj (|Ψ 〉 |+〉 + |Ψ 〉 |−〉 )
− +
ijl q ijl q
1
2
7 1 1 1 ( ⊗ )Z Xui uj (|φ 〉 |+〉 + |φ 〉 |−〉 )
− +
ijl q ijl q
1
2
Table 3.  Correlation between Received Classical Value and its Corresponding Unitary, GHZ 
Transformations and Quantum Bit Transformation Correlation during the Communication Process 
among Three Disjoint Users with Partial Cooperation of Quantum Server.
Value ui Bits uj Bit ui and uj Transformations GHZ Transformation
0 0 0 0 ( ⊗ )I Iui uj (|Ψ 〉 |+〉 + |Ψ 〉 |−〉 )
+ −
ijq l ijq l
1
2
1 0 0 1 ( ⊗ )I Xui uj (|φ 〉 |+〉 + |φ 〉 |−〉 )
+ −
ijq l ijq l
1
2
2 0 1 0 ( ⊗ )X Iui uj (|ψ 〉 |+〉 − |ψ 〉 |−〉 )
+ −
ijq l ijq l
1
2
3 0 1 1 ( ⊗ )X Xui uj (|ϕ 〉 |+〉 − |ϕ 〉 |−〉 )
+ −
ijq l ijq l
1
2
4 1 0 0 ( ⊗ )Y Iui uj (|ψ 〉 |+〉 − |ψ 〉 |−〉 )
− +
ijq l ijq l
1
2
5 1 0 1 ( ⊗ )Y Xui uj (|ϕ 〉 |+〉 − |ϕ 〉 |−〉 )
− +
ijq l ijq l
1
2
6 1 1 0 ( ⊗ )Z Iui uj (|Ψ 〉 |+〉 + |Ψ 〉 |−〉 )
− +
ijq l ijq l
1
2
7 1 1 1 ( ⊗ )Z Xui uj (|φ 〉 |+〉 + |φ 〉 |−〉 )
− +
ijq l ijq l
1
2
Table 4.  Correlation between Received Classical Value and its Corresponding Unitary, GHZ 
Transformations and Quantum Bit Transformation Correlation during the Communication Process 
among Three Disjoint Users with Full Cooperation of Quantum Server.
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which unitary operations are used by the senders to transform the GHZ state according to the original 
generated classical message before it is transmitted to the receiver. By obtaining the applied unitary oper-
ations, the receiver can retrieve the original sent message. The Eight GHZ States are defined by (Eq. (10)).
Ψ = ( ± ), ψ = ( ± )
φ = ( ± ), ϕ = ( ± )
( )
± ±
± ±
1
2
000 111 1
2
011 100
1
2
010 101 1
2
001 110
10
There’re many research groups proposed different approaches for realizing and experimentally generating 
multi-photon GHZ states. In72, an experimental entanglement of six-photon GHZ states, cluster states, 
and graph states is proposed. The generating of six-photon GHZ states and cluster states is achieved by 
EPR-entangled photon pairs. In73 an effective protocol for preparation of N – photon GHZ states with 
conventional photon detectors and can be realized through a simpler optical setup with a high success 
probabilities. In74 a proposed a linear optical protocol to generate GHZ states of N distant photons with 
certain success probabilities. The proposed set up involved simple linear optical elements N pairs of the 
two-photon polarization entangled states, and the conventional photon detectors. In75 an Experimental 
demonstration of five-photon entanglement and open-destination teleportation is proposed by utilizing 
two entangled photon pairs to generate a four-photon entangled state, which is then combined with a 
single-photon state. In76 N – particle GHZ states can be generated easily using the N encoders prepara-
tion with cross-Kerr nonlinearities and can be realized simply through linear optical elements and homo-
dyne detectors. In70 Experimental generation of an eight-photon GHZ state is proposed. An eight-photon 
GHZ state with a measured fidelity of 0.59 ± 0.02 proved the presence of genuine eight-partite entangle-
ment. This is achieved by improving the photon detection efficiency to 25% with a 300-mW laser pump. 
In our scheme, we use the same concept introduced in70,72 to generate shared GHZ states. In order to 
develop the realization of N – particle GHZ states, the photon detection efficiency has to be improved 
basing on laser pump. Furthermore, a large capacity of memory for all parties to store and retrieve the 
required information has to take into consideration.
After a successful completion of the authentication process between the quantum server and a spec-
ified user, the remaining EPR is used to generate shared GHZ states to transmit the secret message among 
communicated users directly. Figure 1 demonstrates how the GHZ states among ui, the quantum server, 
and uj are generated according to the remaining EPR. Suppose, for example, the generated EPR for the 
authentication process between the quantum server and ui is given by (Eq. (11)). The quantum server 
particle is a part of another generated EPR for the purpose of authenticating uj (See Eq. 12). The result 
will then be a shared GHZ state among ui, the quantum server, and uj (See Eq. 13). Similarly, |Ψ 〉
+
iqjl , 
|Ψ 〉, …+iqjlm  and so on can be generated.
|Φ 〉 = (| 〉 + | 〉
( )
+ 1
2
0 0 1 1
11iq i q i q
|Φ 〉(| 〉 + | 〉 ) = (| 〉 + | 〉)(| 〉 + | 〉 )
( )
+ 0 1 1
2
0 0 1 1 0 1
12qj i i q j q j i i
|Ψ 〉 = (| 〉 + | 〉)
( )
+ 1
2
0 0 0 1 1 1
13iqj i q j i q j
Tables  5–8 show the correlation between the quantum server publication, receiver measurement, 
sender operation(s), and sent bits. (Table  5) describes the correlation between the quantum server 
Figure 1. Generation of GHZ States based on Einstein Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) “drawn by A.F”. 
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publication, uj measurement, ui operation, and sent bits during a partial cooperation process between 
two disjoint users. The uj performs a Bell measurement on its particle and the ui particle; the quantum 
server then calculates the status of its particle according to the x basis {+ , − } and announces the meas-
urement results. The uj uses its measurements and the quantum server publications to retrieve the orig-
inal secret bits sent by ui. For example, when the uj measurement is equivalent to ψ
−  and the quantum 
server publication is − , the uj concludes that the ui applied an X operation and the sent bits were 01 
(See Supplementary Table S1) for the correlation during a full cooperation process between two disjoint 
users). Table 6 describes the same correlation of a partial process, but among three disjoint users. Here, 
ul performs a GHZ measurement on its particle, ui particles, and uj particles. The quantum server calcu-
lates the status of its particle according to the x basis {+ , − } and announces the measurement results. 
Then, ul uses its measurement and the quantum server publications to retrieve the original secret bits 
sent by both ui and uj. For example, when the ul measurement is equivalent to ϕ
+  and the quantum 
server publication is − , ul can conclude that ui and uj applied Y and X operations, respectively, and the 
sent bits were 101 (See Supplementary Table S4) for correlation during a full cooperation process between 
Quantum Server  
Publication uj Measurement ui Operation Sent Bits
+ q Φ
+
ij
I 00
+ q ψ
+
ij
X 01
+ q ψ
−
ij
Y 10
+ q Φ
−
ij
Z 11
− q Φ
−
ij
I 00
− q ψ
−
ij
X 01
− q ψ
+
ij
Y 10
− q Φ
+
ij
Z 11
Table 5.  Correlation between Quantum Server Publication, Receiver Measurement, Sender (s) 
Operation(s) and Sent Bits during partial cooperation process between Two Disjoint Users. (C, D) shows 
an illustrative example for transmitting a message 100111 from ui to uj with partial and full support of 
quantum server respectively.
Quantum Server 
Publication ui Measurement ui Operation
Sent 
Bits ui Operation
Sent 
Bits
Message 
Sent
+ q Ψ
+
ijl
I 00 I 0 000
+ q φ
+
ijl
I 00 X 1 001
+ q ψ
+
ijl
X 01 I 0 010
+ q ϕ
+
ijl
X 01 X 1 011
+ q ψ
−
ijl
Y 10 I 0 100
+ q ϕ
−
ijl
Y 10 X 1 101
+ q Ψ
−
ijl
Z 11 I 0 110
+ q φ
−
ijl
Z 11 X 1 111
− q Ψ
−
ijl
I 00 I 0 000
− q φ
−
ijl
I 00 X 1 001
− q ψ
−
ijl
X 01 I 0 010
− q ϕ
−
ijl
X 01 X 1 011
− q ψ
+
ijl
Y 10 I 0 100
− q ϕ
+
ijl
Y 10 X 1 101
− q Ψ
+
ijl
Z 11 I 0 110
− q φ
+
ijl
Z 11 X 1 111
Table 6.  Correlation between Quantum Server Publication, Receiver Measurement, Sender (s) 
Operation(s) and Sent Bits during partial cooperation process among Three Disjoint Users.
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three disjoint users). Tables  7 and 8 illustrate the transmission of messages 100111 from ui to uj with 
partial and full support of the quantum server, respectively.
Results and Discussion
Masquerade as Dishonest Disjoint User Security Analysis. If an attacker would like to masquer-
ade as dishonest disjoint user, then the attacker will work on the transmitting particle u (disjoint user 
particle) from the quantum server to the disjoint user. With the assumption that the attacker applying a 
universal operation R on u see (Eq. (14, 15)).
α β γ δ→ + + + ( )R0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 14u u a u a u a u a0 0 0 0
α β γ δ→ + + + ( )R1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 15u u a u a u a u a1 1 1 1
where R  represents an additional state which is created by the attacker, a represents the attacker particle 
and,
α β γ δ α β γ δ+ + + = + + + = ( )1 160
2
0
2
0
2
0
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
When the attacker applying its operation, a new shared key state will be created see (Eq. (17, 18)).
Φ → Φ ′ ( )
+ +
17qu qu
α β γ δ
α β γ δ
|Φ ′〉 = ( | 〉 + | 〉 + | 〉 + | 〉
+ | 〉 + | 〉 + | 〉 + | 〉) ( )
+ 1
2
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 18
qu q u a q u a q u a q u a
q u a q u a q u a q u a
0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1
The attacker transmits the new formulated state |Φ ′〉+qu  to the quantum server. Afterwards, the quantum 
server performs ₡OP on the received state as a result one of four states |Φ 〉qu
00 , ψ| 〉qu
01 , ψ| 〉qu
10 , |Φ 〉qu
11  which 
equivalent to the dual bits 00, 01, 10 and 11. With the assumption that the dual bits are equivalent to 00 
then the quantum server operation is equivalent see (Eq. (19))
|Φ 〉 = |Φ ′〉 ( )
+₡ 19qu qu
00
0
Through performing ₡0 the result is obtained by (Eq. (20))
ui Plain Message 10 01 11
ui Operation Y X Z
GHZ Transformation ψ ψ(| 〉 | + 〉 − | 〉 | − 〉 )− +ij q ij q
1
2 ψ ψ(| 〉 | + 〉 − | 〉 | − 〉 )
+ −
ij q ij q
1
2 (|Φ 〉 | + 〉 + |Φ 〉 | − 〉 )
− +
ij q ij q
1
2
uj Bell Measurement ψ− ψ+ Φ+
Quantum Server Publication + + − 
uj Retrieved Message 10 01 11
Table 7.  An illustrative example for transmitting a message 100111 from ui to uj with partial support of 
quantum server.
ui Plain Message 10 01 11
ui Operation Y X Z
GHZ Transformation ψ ψ(| 〉 | + 〉 − | 〉 | − 〉 )− +iq j iq j
1
2 ψ ψ(| 〉 | + 〉 − | 〉 | − 〉 )
+ −
iq j iq j
1
2 (|Φ 〉 | + 〉 + |Φ 〉 | − 〉 )
− +
iq j iq j
1
2
Quantum Server Bell Measurement ψ− ψ+ Φ+
uj Publication + + − 
uj Retrieved Message 10 01 11
Table 8.  An illustrative example for transmitting a message 100111 from ui to uj with full support of 
quantum server.
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α β γ δ
α β γ δ
|Φ 〉 = ( | 〉 + | 〉 + | 〉 + | 〉
+ | 〉 + | 〉 + | 〉 + | 〉) ( )
1
2
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 20
qu q u a q u a q u a q u a
q u a q u a q u a q u a
00
0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1
So the chance for discovering the attacker for |Φ 〉qu
00  is Ṕ00 can be computed using (Eq. (20)) as by (Eq. 
(21))
α γ β δ= ( + + + ) ( )Ṕ
1
2 2100 1
2
1
2
0
2
0
2
As well when the dual bits are equivalent to 01, so the chance for discovering the attacker for ψ| 〉qu
01  is 
Ṕ01 can be computed using Eq. (18) as shown in (Eq. (22))
α γ β δ= ( + + + ) ( )Ṕ
1
2 2201 0
2
0
2
1
2
1
2
When the dual bits are equivalent to 10, so the chance for discovering the attacker of ψ| 〉qu
10  is Ṕ10 and 
equivalent to Ṕ01. Furthermore the chance for discovering the attacker of |Φ 〉qu
11  is Ṕ11 and equivalent to 
Ṕ00. Accordingly, the total discovering probability of the attacker ṔTotal of each disjoint user is equivalent 
½ see (Eq. (23, 24))
= ( + + + ) ( )
́ ́ ́ ́ ́P 1
4
P P P P 23Total 00 01 10 11
= ( )Ṕ
1
2 24Total
As stated by Simmons theory77,78, the result of the previous equation proved that the proposed scheme 
is unconditionally secured under this type of attack.
One-way Channel Substitution Fraudulent Attack Security Analysis. As the transmitted parti-
cle from the quantum server to the disjoint user doesn’t contain any fact about the authentication key, 
so in this type of attack only the restored n (new state particle) from the disjoint user to the quantum 
server have to be measured. The maximum reachable information which an attacker may obtain over 
the communicated channel between a quantum server and a disjoint user can be computed by Holevo 
theory79 see (Eq. (25))
As ᶊ (ᵽ) is equivalent to Von Neumann entropy ᵽ ᵽ ᵽ− ( ),Tr log i2  is a component in the hybrid status 
and  is the possibility of ᵽi in the universe ᵽ. So the eavesdropper just has information about the 
authentication key by directly calculating the n (new state particle), so the resulted Ӽ (ᵽ) relies on the 
reduced density matrix of n, by substitution of (Eq. (25)) as shown in (Eq. (26))
As both ᵽn and ᵽni required reduced density matrix for ᵽ and ᵽi respectively. For any authentication key, 
the reduced density matrix of n can be represented in (Eq. (27))
ᵽ = ( Φ Φ ) = ( )T r I
1
2 27n qu r r
In addition to, ᵽni is equivalent to the subsequent equations from ((28) to (32))
|Φ 〉 = (| 〉 + | 〉)
( )
1
2
0 0 0 1 1 1
28r q u n q u n
00
|Φ 〉 = (| 〉 + | 〉)
( )
1
2
0 0 1 1 1 0
29r q u n q u n
01
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|Φ 〉 = (|+ + 〉 + |− − 〉)
( )
1
2
1 0
30r q u n q u n
10
|Φ 〉 = (|+ + 〉 + |− − 〉)
( )
1
2
0 1
31r q u n q u n
11
Therefore;
ᵽ = ( Φ Φ ) = ( )T r I
1
2 32ni qu r
i
r
i
By replacing values for both ᵽn and ᵽni in Eq. (26), Ӽ (ᵽn) = 0. So, the eavesdropper will not reveal any 
information about the key in case of directly calculating the transferred particles over the communicated 
channel from the quantum server to the disjoint user.
Two- Way Channel Substitution Fraudulent Attack Security Analysis. The attacker applies an 
operation Θ1 at his/her side on the transmitted particle u and supportive particle  . Afterwards, the 
attacker transmits the resulted particle to the disjoint user. When the disjoint user receives the transmit-
ted particle, he/she does not realize that there is attacker and he did an operation. The disjoint user 
applyies his normal operation and transmits the resulted particle to the quantum server. The attacker 
intercepts the information particle sent by the disjoint user. The attacker applies an operation Θ2 at his 
side to the information particle and supportive particle η . Afterwards, the attacker transmits the resulted 
particle to the quantum server. The attacker attempts to retrieve certain amount of information about the 
key by employing two supportive particles ε and η (See Supplementary Information 3 for Full Calculations 
of Two - Way Channel Substitution Fraudulent Attack along with equations).
When the two-bit key +A Ai i 1 = 00, so the resulting decoding state by the quantum server is given in 
(Eq. (33, 34))
 φ|Φ 〉 = Θ Θ (|Φ 〉| 〉)|| 〉 |η〉 ( )
+₡ {₡ [ ] } 33qu qu
00
0 2 0 1 n
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
|Φ 〉 = (α α | η 〉 + α β | η 〉
+ β β | η 〉 + β α | η 〉
+ β α | η 〉 + β β | η 〉
+ α α | η 〉 + α α | η 〉 ( )
η η
η η
η η
η η
1
2
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 0 34
qu
00
q u n 00 00 q u n 00 01
q u n 01 10 q u n 01 11
q u n 10 00 q u n 01 01
q u n 11 10 q u n 11 11
We can calculate the total possibility for discovering the attacker (Ṗ Total) in the authentication process 
is given by (Eq. (35))
= / ( = ) + ( = ) ( )  A AP 1 2[P 0 P 1 ] 35Total Total i Total i
If the attacker would like to minimize his/her detection probability, he/she has to adjust Ṗ Total as a 
minimum discovering probability (See Eq. 36) which is calculated under the condition of α α= =η 1
θ= ( ) = ( − ) ( )
Total Min P 1
4
1 cos 36Total
So, the attacker’s total information amount on the transmitted key bits between the quantum server 
and the disjoint user can be estimated in (Eq. (37)).
where ΘTotal represents the total operation performed by the attacker Θ1 and Θ2, x represents the key 
values (00, 01, 10, 11) with probability  indicates the selected random values from variable 
x, = ηµτy ij  with i, j, µ τ, ∈ ,{ 0 1}. Consequently, the joint gained information by attacker’s total 
operation ΘTotal is given in (Eq. (38))
   θ θ θ θ= ( + ) ( + ) + ( + ) ( − ) ( )T
1
4
[ 1 sin log 1 sin 1 sin log 1 sin ] 382 2
Since θ = × − ×Total Totalsin 8 16
2 (see Supplementary Information (4) for Proving Relation 
between θsin  and Total), by substitution in Eq. (38)
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )
=




+ × − × + × − ×
+ − × − × − × − ×



 ( )
T Total Total Total Total
Total Total Total Total
1
4
1 8 16 log 1 8 16
1 8 16 log 1 8 16 39
2
2
2
2
2
2
Therefore the total estimation probability  of AK is given in (Eq. (40))
By simplification of Eq. (40)  of AK is given in (Eq. (41)) (see Supplementary Information (5) for 
Proving Relation between  and θsin )
If  indicates that the total estimation probability  is maximized see (Eq. (42)) (see Supplementary 
Information (6) for Proving Relation between  and Total)
Therefore, the probability of the attacker for successfully retrieving the transmitted keys  
= , , ………………………………for A A A A A{ }k N1 2 3 2  see (Eq. (43))
By substituting (Eq. (42)) in equation (Eq. (43)), so
Figure  2A is shown that the possibility for discovering the attacker while attempting to retrieve any 
information about the key bits is equal to non-zero. For example if Total = 25% means the attacker can 
gain maximal joint information = .T bit0 5  on the transmitted keys between the quantum server and 
disjoint user. From Fig.  2B, we can conclude that when the total estimation probability is maximized 
which means reaching to one, the attacker can positively maximum retrieve 0.5 bit of the transmitted 
key AK while the maximum total estimation probability  is equal to 25%.
Figure  2C illustrates that if the minimum discovery probability is equal to [0, 12.5, 25, 50]% and 
N  = 2, so the maximum values for successfully retrieving the information of the transmitted keys Ak by 
the attacker are [0.25, . × −4 08 10 1, . × −4 08 10 1, . × −1 25 10 1] respectively. Also, for N = 16 the maxi-
mum successfully for retrieving information of the transmitted keys Ak by the attacker is [ . × −1 53 10 5, 
. × , . × , . ×− − −7 7 10 3 91 10 5 96 104 4 8] respectively. So while the number of the transmitted bits is 
increasing, the possibility for successful retrieval the transmitted information is decreased (See 
Supplementary Figure S6 (A–D) and Table S5 (A–D) for Full Calculations for Relation between N, Total, 
).
Figure 2D shows that the maximum and minimum values for successfully retrieving the information 
of the transmitted keys Ak by the attacker while N = [2, 4, 8, 16] . , . , . , . × −are [0 5 0 25 0 0625 3 91 10 ]3  and 
. , . × , . × , . ×− − −[0 0625 3 91 10 1 53 10 2 32 10 ]3 5 10  respectively. We can conclude that all maximum val-
ues are corresponding when  and Total is equal to [50, 0]%. So, the attacker can gain maximum 
information about the transmitted keys Ak at this situation. Furthermore, the minimum value for the 
attacker to gain information about the transmitted keys Ak is . × −[2 32 10 ]10  corresponding when the 
value of  and Total is equal to [12.5, 50]%. (See Supplementary Figure S7 (A–D) and Table S6 (A–D) 
for Full Calculations for Relation between  and N while  = [12.5, 25, 37.5, 50]% and 
= , . , , %Total [0 12 5 25 50 ] ).
Figure 2E demonstrates the maximum and minimum values for successfully retrieving the informa-
tion of the transmitted keys Ak by the attacker while = , , ,N [2 4 8 16] is 
. × , . × , . × , . ×− − − −[1 87 10 3 51 10 1 23 10 1 53 10 ]1 2 3 6  and . × , . × , . × , . ×− − − −[1 56 10 2 5 10 5 96 10 3 55 10 ]2 4 8 15  
respectively. From Fig. 2E, we can conclude that all maximum and minimum values are corresponding 
when  and Total is equal to , . %[50 62 5]  and . , . %[12 5 87 5]  respectively. So, the attacker can gain 
maximum information about the transmitted keys Ak when  and Total equal to , . %[50 62 5]  and 
minimum when  and Total is equal to . , . %[12 5 87 5] . (See Supplementary Figure S8 (A–D) and Table 
S7 (A–D) for Full Calculations for Relation between  and N while  = [12.5, 25, 37.5, 50]% and 
= . , , . %Total [62 5 75 87 5] ).
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Figure 2. Two- Way Channel Substitution Fraudulent Attack Security Analysis. (A) The correlation between 
the joint information T and the minimum discovering probability Total. (B) Correlation between Maximized 
Total Estimation Probability  and the minimum discovering probability Total. (C) Relation between , 
N = [2, 4, 8, 16] and Total = [0, 12.5, 25, 50]%. (D) Relation between  and N while  = [12.5, 25, 37.5, 
50]% and = , . , , %Total [0 12 5 25 50 ] . (E) As Fig. 2D while = . , , . %Total [62 5 75 87 5 ] . (F) Combined Fig. 
2C,D while  = [62.5, 75, 87.5]%. “drawn by A.F”.
Figures 2F and 3 illustrate while the number of transmitted key bits N  becomes larger, the possibility 
of successfully retrieving Ak becomes smaller and reach zero. So, the attacker will not reveal an enormous 
amount of information which can be ignored and avoided by updating key between the disjoint user 
and the quantum server periodically. In this case, the information of the attacker on the old key will be 
useless.
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Generalization of Communication Process between N Disjoint Users with Partial Cooperation 
of Quantum Server. Here, we generalize our approach for Communication Process between N 
Disjoint Users with Partial Cooperation of Quantum Server as shown in Fig. 4A. So, −N 1 disjointed 
disjoint users , , …, −u u uN1 2 1 can transmit a secret message of classical bits to a remote user uN with 
partial cooperation of the quantum server. Firstly the quantum server distributes N particles of +N 1 
particles GHZ state | 〉 = (| … 〉 + | …… 〉)……….
− −
   
GHZ 00 0 0 11 1 1N
N q N N q N
1
1
2
1 1
 to , , …,u u uN1 2 . 
, , …, −u u uN1 2 1 chooses a randomly subset of ……….GHZ N1  and keeps it confident. In addition, gen-
erate a random sequence bit strings of transmitted plain message. Next, each user applies appropriate 
unitary transformation according to his plain message. The bit string value (Ŭ1 ⊗ Ŭ2 ... ⊗ ŬN−1) Ŭ cor-
responds to four Pauli operations {I, X, Y, Z}. Afterwards, the selected 
……….
GHZ N1  will be transformed 
according to , , …, −u u uN1 2 1 plain messages and their applied unitary transformations to 
| 〉 = ( | 〉 |±〉 ± | 〉 |±〉 )′………. ′ ′
, …. +
″
, …. +




GHZ GHZ GHZN N
u u
Users
q
N
quantum
server
N
u u
Users
q
N
quantum
server
1
1
2
1 1N N1 1  where ′, ….  
GHZ N
u u
Users
N1
 and ″
, ….
  
GHZ N
u u
Users
N1
 are one of 
defined GHZ states. Next, 
′………. ′
GHZ N1  transmitted to uN, uN performs N – GHZ measurement on his 
particle and , , …, −u u uN1 2 1 particles. Afterwards, the quantum server calculates the status of his parti-
cle according to x basis {+ , − } and announces his measurement results. uN uses his measurements’ and 
the quantum server publication for retrieving the original secret sent bits by , , …, −u u uN1 2 1. (See 
Supplementary Figures S1 and S3 for Communication Process between Two and Three Disjoint Users 
with Partial Support of Quantum Server respectively).
Generalization of Communication Process between N Disjoint Users with Full Cooperation of 
Quantum Server. Here, we generalize our approach for Communication Process between N Disjoint 
Users with full Cooperation of Quantum Server as shown in Fig. 4B. The sequence of the steps is similar 
to a partial one except that the selected 
……….
GHZ N1  will be transformed to 
| 〉 = ( | 〉 |±〉 ± | 〉 |±〉 )′………. ′ ′
, …, ,
+
″
, …, ,
+
− −
   
GHZ GHZ GHZN N
u q u
Senders
quantum server
N
u
Reciever
N
u q u
Senders
quantum server
N
u
Reciever
1
1
2
N N N N1 1 1 1
 where ′
, …, ,
+
−
  
GHZ N
u q u
Senders
quantum server
N1 1
 and ″
, …, ,
+
−
  
GHZ N
u q u
Senders
quantum server
N1 1
 are 
one of the defined GHZ states. Next, 
′………. ′
GHZ N1  transmitted to the quantum server, quantum server 
performs N – GHZ measurement on his particle and , , …, −u u uN1 2 1 particles. Afterwards, uN calculates 
the status of his particle according to x basis {+ , − } and announces his measurement results. uN uses 
his publication and the quantum server measurement for retrieving the original sent secret bits by 
, , …, −u u uN1 2 1. (See Supplementary Figures S2 and S4 of Communication Process between Two and 
Three Disjoint Users with Full Support of Quantum Server respectively).
Communication Process Security Analysis. After u j retrieves the original secret sent bits which 
sent by ui, ui informs u j about the positions of the transmitted particles and the selected unitary trans-
formation applied to them. Afterwards, u j verifies the selected particles by ui and obtains an approxima-
tion of error percentage in the communication process. If the error percentage is under the specified 
threshold both ui and u j can continue the transmission of the secret messages, otherwise the communi-
Figure 3. Combined Fig. 2C–F “drawn by A.F”.
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cation process will be terminated. If an attacker tries to spy on the transmitted GHZ particles, the attacker 
at most can obtain one particle. So, the attacker couldn’t decide which operation is applied by ui, conse-
quently couldn’t retrieve any transmitted secret bits. Suppose that the attacker apply an operation Θu Ai  
on ui and his qubit A  see (Eq. (45)).
Figure 4. (A) Generalization of Communication Process between N Disjoint Users with Partial Cooperation 
of Quantum Server (B) with Full Cooperation of Quantum Server “drawn by A.F”.
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  
  
 
 
α β
β α
→ +
→ ′ + ′ ( )
0 0 1
1 0 1 45
A u A u A u A
A u A u A u A
00 01
10 11
i i i
i i i
Correspondingly, applying the unitary operation requires the following conditions α
2  + β
2  = 1 and 
α ′
2  + β ′
2  = 1.
So, the state of the protocol is transformed as follows, Firstly, the states after ui made a unitary oper-
ation see (Eq. (46)).
Θ|Ψ 〉 = |Ψ〉 ⊗ | 〉
= (| 〉 | 〉 + | 〉 ± | 〉 ) ⊗ | 〉 ( )½ ∓
A
A000 100 011 111 46
iqjA u iqj A
iqj iqj iqj iqj A
1 i
Secondly, the states after the attacker applies a unitary transformation on ui and his qubit A  see (Eq. 
(47, 48))
   
   
   
   
Θ
α β β α
α β β α
Ψ = Ψ
=









( ± ′ ) + ( ± ′ )
+ ( ′ ) + ( ′ )








 ( )
½
∓ ∓
000 100
011 111
47
iqjA u A iqjA
iqj A iqj A
iqj A iqj A
2 1
00 01 01 11
00 01 01 11
i
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
φ
α β β α
α β β α
φ
α β β α
α β β α
α β β α
α β β α
α β β α
α β β α
=

































+ ( ± + )
+
− ( ± − ± )





+




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+ ( ± − ± )
+
− ( ± + )




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+
Ψ





+ ( + ± )
−
− ( − )




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+
Ψ





+ ( − )
−
− ( + ± )




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


























 ( )
+
′ ′
′ ′
−
′ ′
′ ′
+
′ ′
′ ′
−
′ ′
′ ′



 
 

1
2 2
48
ij
q A
q A
ij
q A
q A
ij
q A
q A
ij
q A
q A
00 01 01 11
00 01 01 11
00 01 01 11
00 01 01 11
00 01 01 11
00 01 01 11
00 01 01 11
00 01 01 11
As shown in (Eq. (47, 48)), the attacker can’t gain any information during intercepting the communica-
tion process. As well the attacker introduces an error probability of ½ irrespective of the sequence of 
measurement. For example, suppose that the attacker measurement is the same as ui means the applied 
unitary transformation may be I or Z. If the measurements are different then the possible applied unitary 
transformation may be X or Y.
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